Stonewall Jackson's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley in 1862.
On the evening of March 11, 1862, Major General Thomas Jonathan “Stonewall” Jackson gathered his subordinates at his headquarters in Winchester, Virginia - Alta Vista - to discuss the merits of defending the city against the approaching Union army commanded by Major General Nathaniel Prentice Banks. Although Jackson’s army of 3,500 paled in numerical strength to Banks’s command of 35,000, Jackson suggested that the Valley army launch a surprise attack on the enemy positioned north of the city. All of the officers present at the meeting disapproved of Jackson’s bold plan and instead urged him to withdraw. The mere thought of evacuating Winchester and leaving it to Federal occupation bothered Jackson. Reverend Dr. James Robert Graham, one of Jackson’s closest confidants in Winchester, noted that Jackson “was bitterly distressed and mortified at the necessity of leaving the people he loved dearly.”
As Jackson’s command marched south on the night of March 11 the mood of Winchester’s Confederate civilians soured as uncertainty loomed. Winchester’s Cornelia McDonald noted that evening: “there were hurried preparations and hasty farewells, and sorrowful faces turning away from those they loved best, and were leaving, perhaps forever.”
Winchester’s Unionists and African Americans on the other hand eagerly awaited Banks’s occupation. The moment they anticipated came on March 12. Unionist Julia Chase reveled in her diary: “Glorious news. The Union Army took possession of Winchester today and the glorious flag is waving over our town.”
As Banks occupied Winchester and made the town’s Confederate civilians in the estimation of resident Mary Greenhow Lee, “prisoners in our own houses,” President Abraham Lincoln began to doubt that his general-in-chief Major General George Brinton McClellan could handle the duties of that job while at the same time directing operations against Richmond via the Virginia Peninsula. After Lincoln determined to restrict McClellan’s responsibilities specifically to the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln informed McClellan he would need to leave behind ample troops to secure Washington, D.C. Consequently, McClellan ordered Banks to send one of his divisions, Brigadier General John Sedgwick’s, from the Valley to Manassas to aid in the protection of the capital. Four days after Banks occupied Winchester, McClellan petitioned Banks to send all of his remaining troops from the Valley to secure the capital save for one brigade which would oversee the reconstruction of the strategically vital Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.
McClellan’s directive troubled Banks. When Banks received McClellan’s order the Federal commander in the Shenandoah Valley did not know the precise strength, location, or objectives of Jackson’s army. This uneasiness prompted Banks to send Brigadier General James Shields on a reconnaissance mission south toward Strasburg. Despite a brief encounter with Confederate cavalry commanded by Colonel Turner Ashby south of Middletown, Shields reported to Banks that he did not deem Jackson’s army any great threat. Confident in Shields’ estimation Banks ordered Brigadier General Alpheus Starkey Williams’ division out of the Valley to aid in the defense of Washington, D.C.
While confidence abounded in Banks’s command, trepidation permeated the Confederate ranks. Shields’ lack of aggression against Ashby created angst in Jackson’s cavalry chief that Shields’ movement portended a much larger removal of Federal forces from the Valley to support McClellan’s operations. News of the withdrawals from the Valley also struck fear into General Joseph E. Johnston who believed that Union forces from the Valley would be funneled east to assist the Army of the Potomac’s campaign against the Confederate capital. Alarmed for the safety of Richmond, Johnston directed Jackson to do whatever necessary in order to prevent additional Union troops from leaving the Valley. “It is important to keep that army in the valley,” Johnston explained to Jackson, “& that it should not reinforce McClellan.” That directive defined Jackson’s role in the Shenandoah - utilize the region as a diversionary theater of war in order to aid in Richmond’s defense and consequently provide hope to a young Confederate nation that seemed to stand at the precipice of military disaster.
On the morning of March 22, Jackson marched his army north from its camps around Mount Jackson to engage the remnants of Banks’s army in the lower Valley. As the infantry columns marched north, Ashby’s cavalry hastened toward Winchester. When they arrived in Newtown (present-day Stephens City) a young boy informed Ashby that all of the Union forces had evacuated Winchester. This report soon proved erroneous. As Ashby’s troopers neared the southern outskirts of Winchester they encountered pickets from Shields’ division - the only portion of Banks’s army that remained in the region. After a small melee, which resulted in the fracturing of Shields’ left arm by an artillery fragment from Captain Roger Preston Chew’s Battery, Ashby’s cavalry withdrew.
Despite the ability of Ashby’s horsemen to crush Shields’ defense, the skirmish offered Ashby a chance to communicate with several civilians who informed him that Shields’ division was making preparations for a complete withdrawal. Visual evidence seemed to corroborate this information. During the fight on March 22 a number of Ashby’s men reported that they saw only “a few tents” and that Winchester “seemed to be evacuated by the enemy.” The intelligence proved false. Shields did not intend to leave. One week after the skirmish with Ashby, Shields explained to his superiors that he purposely took measures to conceal his division of about 8,000 men so as to “deceive” Jackson. The deception, whether planned or not, coupled with the information provided by area civilians compelled Jackson to act immediately.
While military necessity called for Jackson to strike Shields on March 23, before the Federals had an opportunity to move east, the timing of the impending offensive bothered Jackson deeply. If Jackson attacked on March 23 he would be fighting on a Sunday. Deeply concerned about violating the Sabbath, Jackson penned his wife Mary Anna that he was “greatly concerned” to order his men into battle on a Sunday. Despite those reservations, however, Jackson ultimately concluded that “important considerations… rendered it necessary to attack” on March 23.
As Jackson struggled with his decision, the field command of Shields’ division fell upon the shoulders of Colonel Nathan Kimball while Shields recuperated from his wound in Winchester. A physician from Indiana prior to the conflict, and a veteran of the Mexican-American War, Kimball held the esteem of his men as “a stout old fighter.” After Shields gave Kimball command he advised his subordinate to move two of the division’s three brigades south to Kernstown to secure the southern approaches to Winchester.
On the morning of March 23, while the main body of Jackson’s army marched north on the Valley Pike, Colonel Ashby led a contingent of cavalry, three cannon, and four infantry companies to Kernstown. Any confidence held by this contingent of Confederates disappeared as they viewed sixteen Union cannon perched atop the commanding heights of Pritchard’s Hill located west of the Valley Pike. The Union guns, remembered a Confederate artillerist, “replied to our opening shots with a vim which at once bespoke that they meant business.” By 11:00 a.m. the Union artillery along with the destructive fire of Union sharpshooters forced Ashby’s command to withdraw.
After the Confederate retreat Jackson arrived and surveyed the situation. Jackson quickly discerned that the key to winning the battle rested in the ability of his men to silence the Union artillery atop Pritchard’s Hill. With a frontal assault a suicide mission, Jackson ultimately determined to break the Union position by placing Confederate batteries on a piece of unoccupied high ground situated west of Pritchard’s Hill - Sandy Ridge.
At approximately 4:00 p.m. Jackson’s artillery, according to Kimball, “opened a heavy and well directed fire upon our batteries.” Although stunned by the presence of Confederate artillery on Sandy Ridge, Kimball acted quickly and rushed troops to Sandy Ridge to hamper Jackson’s efforts. Throughout the remaining hours of daylight the Confederate brigades of Colonel Samuel Vance Fulkerson and Brigadier General Richard Brook Garnett fought tenaciously on Sandy Ridge, but the constant pressure from Kimball’s regiments, waning ammunition supplies, and a lack of communication between Jackson and his subordinates compelled the Confederates to retreat.
After the defeat at the First Battle of Kernstown, Jackson halted his army about three miles south of the battlefield in Newtown. Neither Jackson nor his army seemed demoralized by the loss. A Confederate artillerist noted of the army’s morale: “Jackson gave up the field, repulsed, but not vanquished, defeated, but not routed nor demoralized.”
Jackson’s counterparts reveled in their victory over Stonewall Jackson in Virginia - a theater of war that had not been kind to Union operations up to this point in the conflict. One Union veteran explained of Kernstown’ s impact on Northern morale: “The victory heartened up the North very greatly, and it threw a shadow upon the reputation which Stonewall Jackson had gained at Bull Run.”
Among those who celebrated Jackson’s defeat was General Shields. Although not present on the battlefield during the fight, Shields claimed credit for the success. Additionally, Shields embellished the overall strength of Jackson’s army to make the Union victory appear to be even grander than initially believed. Shields’ initial communication to the War Department placed the strength of Jackson’s army around 15,000 men. Several days later he reported Jackson’s army stood at 11,000 at the beginning of the battle. In retrospect Shields’ embellishments did more harm than good to Union operations in the Shenandoah Valley. When Banks received Shields’ report of a victory over a numerically superior Confederate force, he sent Williams’ division back to the Valley. Additional troops would soon follow. Overall the War Department redirected about twenty thousand troops - ones that could have been used to support McClellan - to the Shenandoah to deal with Jackson’s army. Thus, through no design of Jackson’s, his tactical defeat transformed into a strategic success. “The battle of Kernstown,” concluded a member of Jackson’s army, “if not to be claimed as a victory for the Confederates served all the purposes of one.”
Throughout the remaining days of March, Jackson marched his army south to the area of Rude’s Hill - a strong defensive position just south of Mount Jackson. There, Jackson set to the work of increasing the size of his army. By mid-April Jackson’s command stood at about 6,000. In addition to bolstering his command, Jackson sought a way to use the Valley’s geography to divide and conquer. To aid him in his task Jackson turned to Captain Jedediah Hotchkiss, a man who possessed an intricate knowledge of the region. Three days after his defeat at Kernstown, Jackson summoned Hotchkiss, who at the time served as an officer in the Augusta County Militia Battalion, to his headquarters. Jackson directed Hotchkiss: “I want you to make me a map of the Valley, from Harper’s Ferry to Lexington, showing all the points of offence and defence in those places.”
As Jackson strengthened his force and contemplated how to use the Valley’s features to his advantage, General Banks marched south with approximately 20,000 men. When Jackson learned of Banks’s pursuit he withdrew south to Conrad’s Store, a place that afforded Jackson numerous strategic advantages. From that one location Jackson could maintain a strong defense, control Swift Run Gap in the Blue Ridge Mountains, while still having the capacity to launch an offensive against Banks should military necessity require it.
After Jackson’s army arrived at Conrad’s Store in mid-April it received additional support when the Army of the Northwest - a small command of approximately 3,500 men commanded by Brigadier General Edward “Old Alleghany” Johnson—attached itself to Jackson’s command. Simultaneously with the support of Johnson’s command, General Robert Edward Lee, who at the time served as military advisor to President Jefferson Davis, informed Jackson that he would also receive support from Major General Richard Stoddert Ewell’s division.
Lee hoped that Jackson would use Ewell to crush Banks; however, the presence of approximately 20,000 Federals commanded by Major General John Charles Frémont west of the Shenandoah Valley troubled Jackson greatly. Since the early part of April the lead elements of Fremont’s army commanded by Brigadier General Robert Huston Milroy moved closer to the Valley as Milroy intended to push toward Staunton and disrupt the vital rail center. Jackson knew that if Milroy succeeded in his mission the Valley army’s lifeline with Richmond would be severed.
Jackson began his campaign to prevent any threat to Staunton by first marching his army east. While Jackson’s movement initially presented the appearance of a withdrawal from the Valley, Jackson marched his men east so that they could board the cars of the Virginia Central Railroad at Mechum’s River Station and then steam west to Staunton. The Valley army arrived in Staunton on May 4 and then marched west. As Jackson’s army marched into the rugged terrain west of Staunton a contingent of cadets from the Virginia Military Institute joined Jackson’s command for the expedition. The polished cadets offered a stark contrast to the battle-tested soldiers of Jackson’s army. “The spruce equipments and the exact drill of the youths… formed a strong contrast with the war-worn and nonchalant veterans,” recalled one chronicler.
On May 8 Jackson engaged the brigades of Milroy and Brigadier General Robert Cumming Schenck at the Battle of McDowell. Jackson followed up his victory with a pursuit of the Federals to Franklin, however, the march proved difficult as Milroy and Schenck set fire to the trees that lined the road from McDowell to Franklin. “Milroy, like the bull of the Southern woodlands,” recalled a veteran of Jackson’s army, “which seeks shelter from mosquitoes in the friendly folds of smoke, fired the mountains right and left as he retreated.” One week after the victory at McDowell - feeling satisfied that he had secured Staunton and prevented any potential unification between Fremont and Banks, Jackson marched his men back to the Shenandoah.
Although a small engagement by later Civil War standards, the Confederate victory at McDowell boosted the spirits of the Confederacy, which by the first week of May 1862 received only bad news from other fronts. A member of Jackson’s staff noted of the electric effect of the victory at McDowell: “This announcement was received by the people of Virginia and of the Confederate States with peculiar delight, because it was the first blush of the returning day of triumphs after a season of gloomy disasters.”
With any immediate threat from Frémont eliminated, Jackson now turned his gaze to Banks’s army. On May 21 Jackson joined with Ewell’s division near Luray and with his ranks swelled to nearly 17,000 men, the Valley army marched north through the Luray Valley to strike the strategic left flank of Banks’s command at Front Royal, an important depot along the Manassas Gap Railroad and the lifeline of Banks’s force.
By the time Jackson turned his attention to Banks, the War Department had considerably reduced the size of Banks’s army by redirecting, once again, troops from the Valley to support McClellan. By mid-May Banks’s command contained less than 10,000 men. What further complicated Banks’s situation was that his army was not concentrated at one point, but rather stretched a distance of more than ten miles between Strasburg and Front Royal. At Front Royal, a location believed by Banks to be an “indefensible position,” Banks placed a command of approximately 1,000 men commanded by Marylander Colonel John Reese Kenly. This weakest portion of Banks’s defensive line became Jackson’s first target.
On May 23, Jackson struck Kenly’s command. When Kenly learned of Jackson’s approach he knew that he stood no chance of defeating Jackson, however he hoped that his small band might be able to delay Jackson for a sufficient amount of time to allow for the evacuation of Union stores from Front Royal. More significantly, Kenly hoped that his efforts at Front Royal would prevent Jackson from moving west and cutting off Banks’s retreat route to Winchester via the Valley Pike. “Colonel Kenly, in a cool and collected manner,” reported the Baltimore Sun, “made an address to his command… he… told them to retreat at that moment would be certain death…. To this the men responded with a cheer that they would stand and fight.”
Throughout the afternoon of May 23, Kenly’s force did all it could to slow Jackson, but the Herculean effort came to an end several miles north of Front Royal at the small crossroads of Cedarville. Kenly formed his men near the home of Thomas McKay and braced for the assault of Colonel Thomas Stanhope Flournoy’s 6th Virginia Cavalry. The troopers annihilated Kenly’s command. Approximately 900 of Kenly’s command, including the twice-wounded Kenly, fell captive to Confederate forces.
With Banks’s line of supply and communication now severed, Jackson turned his focus to the west. On May 24 Jackson marched his army west toward the Valley Pike in an attempt to cut off Banks’s retreat route from Strasburg to Winchester. Unfortunately for Jackson by the time his troops reached the Valley Pike at Middletown the bulk of Banks’s army had passed safely to Winchester. The only portion of Banks’s command which did not fare so well was the Union rear guard commanded by Brigadier General John Porter Hatch. Hatch’s command, along with some Union supply wagons that got a late start out of Strasburg, met a destructive fate at the hands of Confederate artillery batteries commanded by Captain Roger Preston Chew and Captain William Thomas Poague.
When Banks arrived in Winchester he placed his command in a strong defensive position on the southern end of town with both of his flanks anchored on high ground. Although Banks held the advantage of terrain, Banks never dreamed he would be able to defeat the numerically superior Jackson. Banks viewed any opportunity for battle as a chance to delay Jackson long enough to allow the Union wagon trains sufficient time to withdraw across the Potomac River. General Williams, the only division commander Banks had left, recalled of the sentiment in Banks’s officers corps: “It was decided to make a fight as we were, in front of the town . . . . The prospect was gloomy enough… but we could not get away without a show of resistance, both to know the enemy’s position and to give our trains a chance to get to the rear.”
At approximately 5:40 a.m. Jackson began his assault. Ewell’s division struck first against Banks’s left flank atop Camp Hill. The obstinate resistance of Colonel Dudley Donnelly’s brigade turned Ewell’s efforts into a stalemate. With Camp Hill unable to be broken, Jackson now looked to crack Banks’s extreme right flank on Bowers’ Hill. Here Jackson turned to the shock troops of his Valley army - Brigadier General Richard Taylor’s Louisiana Brigade. Taylor led a successful flank attack against Bowers’ Hill and easily crushed the position held by Colonel George Henry Gordon’s brigade.
Unable to resist the onslaught Banks’s men took their heels. As the Federal soldiers retreated through Winchester they not only had to worry about being captured by Jackson’s men, but also had to be concerned with angry Confederate civilians who used the opportunity to vent their frustration by shooting at their former occupiers. Lieutenant Robert Gould Shaw, who served with the 2nd Massachusetts Infantry, wrote to his family in Boston: “The inhabitants did their share from the windows - women as well as men. I hope that the town will be destroyed when we go back there.”
The news of Jackson’s victories at Front Royal and Winchester raised the spirits of the Confederacy. The Richmond Examiner celebrated: “Richmond yesterday experienced a decided and wholesome feeling of elation and rejoicing… of the glorious successes of Jackson. It was earnestly hoped the achievements in the valley might speedily find their counterpart nearer Richmond.”
While Jackson’s success at Winchester greatly bolstered the mood of the young Confederate nation, it arguably emerged as the pivotal moment in Jackson’s military career where people in both North and South began to notice Jackson’s military prowess. Northern journalist Alfred Townsend observed of the centrality of Winchester’s role in defining Jackson’s legacy: “Jackson’s glory has steadily increased. He was first brought into notice at Winchester.” Additionally, if one trusts artwork as a tool of historical interpretation as did the nineteenth-century English intellectual John Ruskin, the notion that the Confederate victory at Winchester catapulted Jackson to national prominence gains more credence. When artists William D. (records of his middle name are conflicting) Washington, noted for his Burial of Latané, and Louis Mathieu Didier Guillaume received separate commissions to produce paintings of Jackson in the immediate aftermath of his death, both painters chose scenes from his victory over Banks at Winchester as the setting for the painting.
With Jackson’s star on the rise and renewed optimism in the Confederacy, Union war-planners sought ways to silence Jackson. The Lincoln administration knew that, with Banks defeated, it had to turn to Generals Frémont and Shields to neutralize Jackson. Ideally, Lincoln hoped Frémont could converge on Jackson from the west and Shields’ division from the east. The two Union commands, however, suffered significant supply issues and moved slowly. This, coupled with intelligence Jackson gathered about a potential unification between Frémont and Shields, allowed the Confederate army to slip south of Strasburg - the place where the junction should have occurred between Frémont and Shields.
Unable to trap Jackson in the lower Valley, Frémont and Shields had no other choice but to pursue in two separate columns. Frémont marched south through the main Shenandoah Valley, while Shields paralleled the pursuit east of the Massanutten Mountain in the Luray Valley. Jackson knew that at this point in the campaign terrain became his strongest ally. So long as he could keep the Massanutten between Frémont and Shields, Jackson believed he could win. As Jackson moved south he tried to anticipate where the two armies might try to link. Jackson knew that if they did link they would have to cross the South Fork of the Shenandoah River. With all of the bridges over the river destroyed, Jackson concluded that only one place became the likely candidate for a unification of Frémont’s and Shields’ commands, the river junction of the North River and South Fork at Port Republic.
Frémont pursued Jackson closely and on June 6 engaged the rear of Jackson’s column at Harrisonburg. Although a small engagement that resulted in a Confederate victory, it cost Jackson the loss of his cavalry chief Ashby. Two days later a portion of Jackson’s army commanded by Ewell clashed with and defeated Frémont at the Battle of Cross Keys, a small hamlet situated midway between Harrisonburg and Port Republic.
On June 9, the day after Ewell’s victory at Cross Keys, Jackson attacked troops from Shields’ division commanded by Brigadier General Erastus Bernard Tyler in the Battle of Port Republic - the final battle of Jackson’s 1862 Valley Campaign. Union artillery posted atop a high eminence known as the Coaling initially wreaked havoc on Jackson’s forces, however repeated pressure from General Taylor’s Louisiana troops forced the Federals to cede control of the battlefield to Jackson.
Following his victory at Port Republic, Jackson marched his army to Brown’s Gap in the Blue Ridge. Uncertain as to how Frémont and Shields would react, Jackson believed it best to go on the defensive after Port Republic. However, when neither Union general threatened Jackson, Stonewall moved his army back into the Valley to Weyers Cave. Ideally, Jackson hoped that he would receive additional reinforcements to continue his work in the Shenandoah Valley, but the newly minted commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, General Lee, had other plans for Jackson east of the Blue Ridge. On June 18 Jackson’s 1862 Valley Campaign officially closed as his army marched east.
By the time Jackson’s army marched to unite with Lee no person in the Confederacy held more of an iconic reputation than Stonewall Jackson. Throughout his spring campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, Jackson’s army covered nearly 700 miles, won five battles, created a strategic diversion that alleviated pressure on Richmond and perhaps most importantly of all inspired hope in despondent hearts of the Confederacy’s people.
Some in the Confederacy believed that Jackson’s victories would elevate him to the highest leadership position in the Confederacy. Mary Chestnut confided in her diary: “This Stonewall. He fights to win - God bless him and he wins. He will be our leader… after all.”
Respect for Jackson also existed in the North. Although the name of Jackson struck fear into the hearts and minds of many Northerners, they could not help but admire Jackson’s military genius. Following his victory at Port Republic the New York Times praised Jackson: “One thing is certain, Jackson is equally eminent as a strategist and tactician. He handles his army like a whip, making it crack out of the way corners where you scarcely thought it would reach.”
While Jackson added to his iconic reputation over the next eleven months and arguably saved his greatest battlefield feat for Chancellorsville, his operations in the Shenandoah Valley in the spring of 1862 offered the only moment where his full abilities as a general could be put on full display. Perhaps it was Confederate veteran and author John Esten Cooke who best captured how Jackson’s generalship during the Valley Campaign - one still studied at military academies around the world-defined his immortal legacy: “This campaign made the fame of Jackson as a commander. . . . The rumor of his rapid movements and constant successes came like a wind from the mountains to the Confederate capital and infused fresh life into the languid pulses and desponding hearts of the people.”
Peter Cozzens, Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson’s 1862 Valley Campaign. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008.
William Allan, History of the Campaign of Gen. T.J. (Stonewall) Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1880.
Paul Christopher Anderson, Blood Image: Turner Ashby in the Civil War and the Southern Mind. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002.
Richard L. Armstrong, The Battle of McDowell: Jackson’s Valley Campaign, March 11-May 8, 1862. Lynchburg, VA: H.E. Howard, 1990.
Brandon H. Beck & Charles S. Grunder, The First Battle of Winchester. Lynchburg, VA: H.E. Howard, 1992.
Millard K. Bushong, General Turner Ashby and Stonewall’s Valley Campaign. Berryville, VA: Virginia Book Co., 1980.
Champ Clark, Decoying the Yanks: Jackson’s Valley Campaign. Alexandria, VA: Time Life Books, 1984.
Darrell L. Collins, The Battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic. Lynchburg, VA: H.E. Howard, 1993.
Gary L. Ecelbarger, Three Days in the Shenandoah: Stonewall Jackson at Front Royal and Winchester. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008.
Gary L. Ecelbarger, “We Are in for It!” The First Battle of Kernstown. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing, 1997.
Roderick Rodgers Gainer, Jr., The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.
Wallace Hettle, Inventing Stonewall Jackson: A Civil War Hero In History and Memory. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2011.
Robert K. Krick, Conquering the Valley: Stonewall Jackson at Port Republic. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996.
Jonathan A. Noyalas, “My Will is Absolute Law”: A Biography of Union General Robert H. Milroy. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2006.
Jonathan A. Noyalas, Stonewall Jackson’s 1862 Valley Campaign: War Comes to the Homefront. Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2010.
James I. Robertson, Jr., Stonewall Jackson: The Man, The Soldier, The Legend. New York: Macmillan, 1997.
Robert G. Tanner, Stonewall in the Valley: Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign, Spring 1862. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976.
Time Life Books, eds., Voices of the Civil War: Shenandoah 1862. Alexandria, VA: Time Life Books, 1997.
Shenandoah Valley Battlefields Foundation
Managers of the Shenandoah Valley Battlefields National Historic District.
Kernstown Battlefield Association
All-volunteer organization which owns more than three hundred acres of land associated with the First and Second Battles of Kernstown.
Stonewall Jackson’s Headquarters Museum, Winchester, Virginia
Building used as Stonewall Jackson’s headquarters from November 1861-March 11, 1862. Contains an impressive collection of Jackson artifacts.
Society of Port Republic Preservationists
All-volunteer organization which maintains the Frank Kemper House in Port Republic—the building where Gen. Turner Ashby’s remains were taken after he was killed at the fight on Chestnut Ridge in Harrisonburg on June 6, 1862.
The Valley of the Shadow: Two Communities in the American Civil War was conceived and designed by Dr. Edward Ayers, now President of the University of Richmond. This website contains a treasure trove of primary material from Augusta County, Virginia, and Franklin County, Pennsylvania. Although it covers the immediate prewar and postwar years in addition to the conflict, it contains valuable primary material related to Jackson’s 1862 Valley Campaign.
No other sources listed.